Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20686 
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dc.contributor.authorLundberg, Shellyen
dc.contributor.authorStartz, Richarden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:15:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:15:57Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20686-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents several economic models that explore the relationships betweenimperfect information, racial income disparities, and segregation. The use of race as a signalarises here, as in models of statistical discrimination, from imperfect information about thereturn to transactions with particular agents. In a search framework, signaling supports notsimply a discriminatory equilibrium, but a pattern of racially segregated transactions, which inturn perpetuates the informational asymmetries. Minority groups necessarily sufferdisproportionately from segregation, since the degree to which transactions opportunities arecurtailed depends upon group size, as well as the informational ?distance? between racialgroups. However, in some variants of the model, minority agents will self-segregate sincethey face an adverse selection of majority agents who are willing to trade with them. We alsoshow that, if agents are able to learn from transactions, racial signaling can emerge with onlyminimal assumptions about the ex ante importance of race.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1389en
dc.subject.jelJ7en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordraceen
dc.subject.keywordsegregationen
dc.subject.keyworddiscriminationen
dc.subject.keywordimperfect informationen
dc.subject.keywordsearchen
dc.subject.stwLohndifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwEthnische Diskriminierungen
dc.subject.stwSegregationen
dc.subject.stwSuchtheorieen
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwEthnische Beziehungenen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInformation and Racial Exclusion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn47632341Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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