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Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20671
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gächter, Simon | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Riedl, Arno | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T16:15:51Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T16:15:51Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20671 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA Discussion paper series 1375 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D63 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C78 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C92 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | bankruptcy problems with claims | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | proportional rule | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | equal-awards rule | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | equallosses rule | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | fairness | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | laboratory experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | vignette | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Konkursverwaltung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gerechtigkeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verhandlungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims: Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 476090067 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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| dp1375.pdf | | 336.08 kB | Adobe PDF |
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