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dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten
dc.contributor.authorHenrich, Josephen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:15:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:15:13Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20588-
dc.description.abstractIn recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signalling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations ofstrong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x712en
dc.subject.jelA13en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordmaladaptationen
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary foundationsen
dc.subject.keywordhuman altruismen
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwBioökonomiken
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleIs Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn360597408en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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