Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20588
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dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten_US
dc.contributor.authorHenrich, Josephen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:15:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:15:13Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20588-
dc.description.abstractIn recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signalling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations ofstrong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x712en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordmaladaptationen_US
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary foundationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordhuman altruismen_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwBioökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIs Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruismen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn360597408en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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