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Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20564
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Roider, Andreas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T16:15:02Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T16:15:02Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20564 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns out to be optimal if (i) the decision-dependent parts of the payoffs of the parties are linear in the asset value, and (ii) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted competencies is optimal if some additional continuity requirements are met. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA Discussion paper series 1298 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | delegation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | decentralization | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | authority | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incomplete contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | hold-up | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | property rights | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kooperative Führung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dezentrale Organisation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unvollständiger Vertrag | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Investition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Sunk Costs | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 464451868 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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