EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGautier, Pieter A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMoraga-González, José Luisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:45Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524-
dc.description.abstractWe examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers apply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically, unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labor market tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v) the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses the wage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessive number of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion paper series 1260en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelD4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordination frictionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterneten_US
dc.subject.keywordjob searchen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen_US
dc.subject.keywordwage dispersionen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnbildungen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStrategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applicationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn395918529en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
dp1260.pdf2.24 MBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.