|
EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gautier, Pieter A. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Moraga-González, José Luis | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T16:14:45Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T16:14:45Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers apply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically, unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labor market tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v) the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses the wage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessive number of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA Discussion paper series 1260 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J64 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D4 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | coordination frictions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | internet | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | job search | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | minimum wage | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | wage dispersion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Lohnbildung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Lohnverhandlungen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nash-Gleichgewicht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Lohnverhandlungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsuche | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 395918529 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
| File |
Description |
Size | Format |
| dp1260.pdf | | 2.24 MB | Adobe PDF |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|