Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20444
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dc.contributor.authorPeter, Klara Sabirianovaen_US
dc.contributor.authorEarle, John S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:09Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20444-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of neighborhood effects in wage payment delays. Positive feedbackarises because each employer?s arrears affect the late payment costs faced by other firms inthe same local labor market, resulting in a strategic complementarity in the practice. Themodel is estimated on panel data for workers and firms in Russia, facilitating identificationthrough the use of a rich set of covariates and fixed effects at the level of the employee, theemployer, and the local labor market. We also exploit a policy intervention affecting publicsector workers that provides an instrumental variable to estimate the endogenous reaction inthe non-public sector. Consistently across specifications, the estimated reaction functiondisplays strongly positive neighborhood effects, and the estimates of four feedback loops – operating through worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties – imply that costs of delaysare attenuated by neighborhood arrears. We also study a nonlinear case exhibiting twostable equilibria: a ?punctual payment equilibrium? and a ?late payment equilibrium.? Theestimates imply that the theoretical conditions for multiple equilibria under symmetric locallabor market competition are satisfied in our data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1198en_US
dc.subject.jelA12en_US
dc.subject.jelB52en_US
dc.subject.jelP37en_US
dc.subject.jelJ30en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.jelP31en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordwage arrearsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontract violationen_US
dc.subject.keywordneighborhood effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial interactionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmultiple equilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordnetwork externalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic complementarityen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnen_US
dc.subject.stwVerbindlichkeitenen_US
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwNachbarschaftsökonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwÜbergangswirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwRusslanden_US
dc.subject.stwLohnrückständeen_US
dc.titleContract Violations, Neighborhood Effects, and Wage Arrears in Russiaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn390563285en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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