EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20430
  
Title:Managerial Job Assignment and Imperfect Competition in Asymmetric PDF Logo
Authors:Grossmann, Volker
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion paper series 738
Abstract:This paper develops a model with multiple market locations in which the quality of intangible assets of firms, provided by management, determines the firms? performance. Despite an exante symmetry of potential entrants, the equilibrium assignment of heterogeneous managerial skills to firms tends to be asymmetric. This sorting outcome determines both the goods market structure at single locations and the size distribution of firms. Results are consistent with a number of observed patterns regarding the size distribution of firms and establishments, and the relation of firm size to profitability, productivity, managerial skills and manager remuneration.
Subjects:asymmetric equilibrium
firm size
intangible assets
managerial jobassignment
JEL:D40
J31
L16
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
dp738.pdf1.04 MBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20430

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.