Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20368
Authors: 
Burda, Michael C.
Boeri, Tito
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 1133
Abstract: 
Firing frictions and renegotiation costs affect worker and firm preferences for rigid wages versus individualized Nash bargaining in a standard model of equilibrium unemployment, in which workers vary by observable skill. Rigid wages permit savings on renegotiation costs and prevent workers from exploiting the firing friction. For standard calibrations, the model can account for political support for wage rigidity by both workers and firms, especially in labor markets for intermediate skills. The firing friction is necessary for this effect, and reinforces the impact of both turbulence and other labor market institutions on preferences for rigid wages.
Subjects: 
wage rigidities
job protection
firing taxes
renegotiation costs
equilibrium unemployment
JEL: 
D7
J6
J5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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