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Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Irlenbusch, Bernd | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sliwka, Dirk | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T16:11:48Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T16:11:48Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2003 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA Discussion paper series 887 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | transparency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | reciprocity | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | reputation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | gift exchange | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | inequity aversion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsvertrag | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gerechtigkeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 371985439 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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