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Title:Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations PDF Logo
Authors:Irlenbusch, Bernd
Sliwka, Dirk
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion paper series 887
Abstract:The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases.
Subjects:transparency
reciprocity
reputation
gift exchange
inequity aversion
JEL:C72
J33
C91
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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