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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126
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| Title: | | Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations  |
| Authors: | | Irlenbusch, Bernd Sliwka, Dirk |
| Issue Date: | | 2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion paper series 887 |
| Abstract: | | The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases. |
| Subjects: | | transparency reciprocity reputation gift exchange inequity aversion |
| JEL: | | C72 J33 C91 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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