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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20120
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Koeniger, Winfried | en |
dc.contributor.author | Vindigni, Andrea | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:11:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:11:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20120 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Product market regulation and employment protection are highly correlated across OECD countries. Using an augmented model of monopolistic competition we show why in countries with more regulated product markets, incumbent workers prefer to protect jobs relatively more. Product market regulation increases the scope for employment protection because firms can bear the cost of employment protection more easily and still break even. Moreover, product market regulation decreases employment so that the workers' outside optionbecomes relatively worse. This increases the incentive to protect the job. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x880 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L16 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J65 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J63 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | collective dismissal cost | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political economy | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kündigungsschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Regulierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Monopolistischer Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kündigung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kosten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Insider-Outsider-Modell | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Employment Protection and Product Market Regulation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 371982480 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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