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Title:Employment Protection and Product Market Regulation PDF Logo
Authors:Koeniger, Winfried
Vindigni, Andrea
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion paper series 880
Abstract:Product market regulation and employment protection are highly correlated across OECD countries. Using an augmented model of monopolistic competition we show why in countries with more regulated product markets, incumbent workers prefer to protect jobs relatively more. Product market regulation increases the scope for employment protection because firms can bear the cost of employment protection more easily and still break even. Moreover, product market regulation decreases employment so that the workers' outside option becomes relatively worse. This increases the incentive to protect the job.
Subjects:collective dismissal cost
political economy
JEL:L16
J65
J63
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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