EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20098
  
Title:Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market PDF Logo
Authors:Irlenbusch, Bernd
Sliwka, Dirk
Issue Date:2003
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion paper series 855
Abstract:We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström?s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents? unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed about first-period profits. In a different treatment firms additionally learn the abilities of agents. Theory suggests high first-period equilibrium effort in the hidden ability treatment but no effort elsewhere. However, we find that effort is significantly higher in the revealed ability treatment and therefore conclude that transparency does not weaken, but strengthen career concerns incentives.
Subjects:incentives
labour market
reputation
reciprocity
career concerns
JEL:J33
C91
C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
dp855.pdf523.02 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20098

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.