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dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden_US
dc.description.abstractTwo agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine- mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equi- libria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPapers on economics & evolution 0506en_US
dc.subject.keywordgames with frequency-dependent stage payoffsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlimiting average rewarden_US
dc.subject.keywordrenewable common-pool resourcesen_US
dc.subject.stwErneuerbare Ressourcenen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.titleA small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Papers on Economics and Evolution, Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik

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