|
EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Papers on Economics and Evolution, MPI für Ökonomik >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Joosten, Reinoud | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T16:10:33Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T16:10:33Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine- mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equi- libria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Papers on economics & evolution 0506 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q20 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | limiting average reward | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | equilibria | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | renewable common-pool resources | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Allmenderessource | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Erneuerbare Ressourcen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dynamisches Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 495265225 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Papers on Economics and Evolution, MPI für Ökonomik
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|