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dc.contributor.authorCordes, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchubert, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:10:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:10:30Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20020-
dc.description.abstractThis paper delivers a step toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract. While mainstream social contract theory is based on an original position model that is defined in an aprioristic way, we endogenize its key elements, i.e., develop them out of the individuals? moral common sense. Therefore, the biological and social basis of moral intuitions are explored. In this context, a key adaptation during evolution was the one that enabled humans to understand conspecifics as intentional agents. Since these behavioral aspects are considered to be an exaptation, they are not amenable to direct genetic explanations or to rationalitybased approaches.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPapers on economics & evolution 0501en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelB52en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSocial contract theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordFairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordIntentionalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordEmpathyen_US
dc.subject.keywordHumanen_US
dc.subject.stwSozialvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionsökonomiken_US
dc.titleToward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contracten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn495256366en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Papers on Economics and Evolution, MPI für Ökonomik

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