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dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen_US
dc.description.abstractThe paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final allocation of private goods and admission tickets for excludable public goods. Under an affiliation assumption on the underlying distribution, optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and admission fees have the same qualitative properties as in unidimensional models. These properties are obtained for utilitarian welfare maximization and for a Ramsey-Boiteux formulation with interim participation constraints.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004/14en_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Income Taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic-Sector Pricingen_US
dc.subject.keywordMultidimensional Mechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.keywordRamsey-Boiteux Pricingen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.titleOptimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing : A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economicsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
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