EconStor >
Verein für Socialpolitik >
Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer, Verein für Socialpolitik >
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2007 (Göttingen) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19869
  
Title:Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime PDF Logo
Authors:Hefeker, Carsten
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 13
Abstract:The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime.
Subjects:debt crisis
currency crisis
exchange rate regime
JEL:F33
F34
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2007 (Göttingen)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
Hefeker.pdf105.46 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19869

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.