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dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:07:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:07:19Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811-
dc.description.abstractThe number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 18en_US
dc.subject.jelG33en_US
dc.subject.jelK10en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCredit marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbank competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen_US
dc.subject.keywordbankruptcyen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelationship bankingen_US
dc.titleQuality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcyen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500758492en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec05:3491-
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2005 (Kiel)

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