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Title:Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy PDF Logo
Authors:Hainz, Christa
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 18
Abstract:The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.
Subjects:Credit markets
institutions
bank competition
information sharing
bankruptcy
relationship banking
JEL:G33
K10
G21
D82
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2005 (Kiel)

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