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dc.contributor.authorBlackburn, Keithen_US
dc.contributor.authorForgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:07:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:07:18Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19808-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 15en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelO11en_US
dc.subject.jelD31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen_US
dc.subject.keyworddevelopment.en_US
dc.titleDistribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernanceen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500755345en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec05:3488-
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2005 (Kiel)

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