EconStor >
Verein für Socialpolitik >
Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer, Verein für Socialpolitik >
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2005 (Kiel) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19799
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBoerner, Kiraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:07:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:07:14Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19799-
dc.description.abstractIn transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as a majority of the people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 6en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordFinancial Marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordDevelopmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordVotingen_US
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutionsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500742979en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec05:3479-
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2005 (Kiel)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
Boerner.pdf322.46 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.