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Deutsche Bundesbank, Forschungszentrum, Frankfurt am Main >
Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19742
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Koetter, Michael | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bos, Jaap W. B. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Heid, Frank | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kool, Clemens J. M. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kolari, James W. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Porath, Daniel | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T16:02:49Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T16:02:49Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19742 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The inability of most bank merger studies to control for hidden bailouts may lead to biased results. In this study, we employ a unique data set of approximately 1,000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use data on the regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. We find that, among merging banks, distressed banks had the worst profiles and acquirers perform somewhat better than targets. However, both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than our control group. In fact, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion Paper, Series 2: Banking and Financial Supervision 2005,09 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G34 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Mergers | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | bailout | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | X-efficiency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | multinomial logit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Bank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Fusion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Übernahme | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unternehmenssanierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Bankinsolvenz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Schätzung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Deutschland | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Accounting for distress in bank mergers | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 503997730 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:4264 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank
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