EconStor >
Deutsche Bundesbank, Forschungszentrum, Frankfurt am Main >
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19714
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWeber, Ankeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:02:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:02:12Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19714-
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a theoretical model of dynamic decision-making of a monetary policy committee with heterogeneous members. It investigates the optimal transparency, and the optimal way of transmitting information of committees, by analysing the effects different communication strategies have on financial markets. It is shown that the communication strategy of the central bank committee has a significant effect on the predictability of monetary policy decisions when there is asymmetric information between the committee and market agents. Transparency about the diversity of views of the committee surrounding the economic outlook makes future monetary policy more predictable. However, communicating the diversity of views regarding monetary policy decisions may lead to less predictability of monetary policy in the short term. In addition, it is shown that communication in the form of voting records has the greatest effect on market participants' near term policy expectations. These results support findings of the empirical literature and have strong implications for the optimal communication strategies of committees including the question whether individual voting records should be published.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2008,02en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelE50en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMonetary Policy Committeesen_US
dc.subject.keywordUncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordCommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordTransparencyen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwGruppenentscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzmarkten_US
dc.subject.stwZinsstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCommunication, decision-making and the optimal degree of transparency of monetary policy committeesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558639275en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bubdp1:7037-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
200802dkp.pdf444.21 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.