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Title:Taxing deficits to restrain government spending and foster capital accumulation PDF Logo
Authors:Stähler, Nikolai
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2007,26
Abstract:In a dynamic model of fiscal policy, social polarization provokes a deficit bias. Policy advisors have recently proposed that governments running a deficit should be forced to generate additional tax revenue. We show that this deficit taxation reduces the deficit bias as it internalizes the externality different lobby groups impose on others. The mechanism described here is not due to the political risk of being elected out of office because the private sector dislikes taxation. Lower government spending and the resulting reduced deficit bias augment capital accumulation.
Subjects:fiscal rules
deficit taxation
capital accumulation
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank

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