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Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19681
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| Title: | | Unemployment and employment protection in a unionized economy with search frictions  |
| Authors: | | Stähler, Nikolai |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2007,04 |
| Abstract: | | In theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection decreases job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal. |
| Subjects: | | employment protection search and matching models unemployment unions |
| JEL: | | J68 J65 J64 J41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank
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