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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19523
  

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dc.contributor.authorRocholl, Jörgen_US
dc.coverage.temporal1998-2002en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:59:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:59:10Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19523-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between 1998 and 2002. It documents the seller's use of discretion and its influence on auction outcomes and bidding strategies. The evidence suggests that the seller uses its discretion frequently and substantially. It does not maximize revenues in a single-period game, but moves up in the competitive demand curve to set the auction price close to the market price. Bidders do not make profits in German auctions on average, while their bidding strategies reflect the uncertainty created by the seller's discretion. The paper extends and tests the multi-unit auction model by Lengwiler (1999). The empirical evidence is consistent with the implication that the market-clearing price depends on the seller's marginal cost rather than on the submitted demand.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2005,15en_US
dc.subject.jelH63en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDiscriminatory auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordWinner's curseen_US
dc.subject.keywordSeller discretionen_US
dc.subject.stwSchatzpapieren_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Anleiheen_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapieremissionen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleDiscriminatory auctions with seller discretion: evidence from German treasury auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn487740661en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bubdp1:3374-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank

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