Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19523
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dc.contributor.authorRocholl, Jörgen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:59:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:59:10Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19523-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between1998 and 2002. It documents the seller's use of discretion and its influence on auction outcomesand bidding strategies. The evidence suggests that the seller uses its discretion frequentlyand substantially. It does not maximize revenues in a single-period game, but movesup in the competitive demand curve to set the auction price close to the market price. Biddersdo not make profits in German auctions on average, while their bidding strategies reflectthe uncertainty created by the seller's discretion. The paper extends and tests the multi-unitauction model by Lengwiler (1999). The empirical evidence is consistent with the implicationthat the market-clearing price depends on the seller's marginal cost rather than on thesubmitted demand.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDeutsche Bundesbank |cFrankfurt a. M.-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank |x2005,15en_US
dc.subject.jelH63en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDiscriminatory auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordWinner's curseen_US
dc.subject.keywordSeller discretionen_US
dc.subject.stwSchatzpapieren_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Anleiheen_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapieremissionen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleDiscriminatory auctions with seller discretion: evidence from German treasury auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn487740661en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bubdp1:3374-

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