EconStor >
Deutsche Bundesbank, Forschungszentrum, Frankfurt am Main >
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19505
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorvon Hagen, Jürgenen_US
dc.contributor.authorWolff, Guntram B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:59:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:59:02Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19505-
dc.description.abstractFiscal rules, such as the excessive deficit procedure and the stability and growth pact (SGP), aim at constraining government behavior. Milesi-Ferretti (2003) develops a model in which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting. The amount of this creative accounting depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to the rule. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the European Union. We find that the SGP rules have induced governments to use stock-flow adjustments, a form of creative accounting, to hide deficits. This tendency to substitute stock-flow adjustments for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit, as in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2004,38en_US
dc.subject.jelH62en_US
dc.subject.jelH70en_US
dc.subject.jelH61en_US
dc.subject.jelE62en_US
dc.subject.jelH63en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFiscal rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordstock-flow adjustmentsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddebt-deficit adjustmentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstability and growth pacten_US
dc.subject.keywordexcessive deficit procedureen_US
dc.subject.keywordESA 95en_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Stabilitätspakten_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKonvergenzkriterienen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzkontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Rechnungswesenen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Schuldenen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleWhat do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EUen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477279244en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bubdp1:2916-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
200438dkp.pdf293.18 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.