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HWWA Discussion Paper, Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19354
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ursprung, Heinrich W. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:57:30Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:57:30Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2002 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19354 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | HWWA Discussion Paper 193 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | political competition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | lobbying | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | interest groups | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | campaign contributions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Interessenpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlkampffinanzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Lobbying and political polarization | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 349218781 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26219 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | HWWA Discussion Paper, Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv
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| 193.pdf | | 176.24 kB | Adobe PDF |
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