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Title:Transfer of Institutions: Actors and Constraints - The Russian Case in a Global Context PDF Logo
Authors:Oleinik, Anton
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:HWWA Discussion Paper 320
Abstract:Modernity is usually thought as a complex society with clearly differentiated spheres of everyday life. It means, in particular, that economic rules do not interfere with the norms structuring political, social, scientific and other interactions. The complex, differentiated society sharply contrasts with a ?small? and homogeneous ?pre-modern? society. The process of modernization, i.e. differentiation of the spheres of everyday life, can take various forms. In an advanced country it relies on internal forces. Modernization in this context looks like an evolutionary, ?bottom-up? development. In a backward country (Russia and Germany in the first half of the 20th century), modernization requires a strong governmental (from the top to the bottom) intervention. Invidious comparison with more advanced and successful countries makes the state officials in backward countries accept the way of reforms. Due to the lack of the internal forces leading to an evolutionary rise of modernity, the state officials refer to the Western experience and know-how. Consequently, a ?catch-up? modernization naturally transforms into ?Westernization?, the transfer of Western institutions to backward countries. As the title suggests, the paper deals with the institutional problems of such a transfer of institutions, and with the constraints, imposed on the key actors of this process, the political elite. It will be argued, that a decisive problem of political and economic modernization in Russia is that bureaucrats face soft external and internal constraints. An absolute imperative consists in institutional congruence, or the ?elective affinity?, between the models of power relationships on which imported and traditional institutions are based. Only a passive role in carrying out reforms is reserved for non-governmental actors, which transforms their mental models into a hard constraint of reforms and prevent them from putting limits on the rulers? discretion. Consequently, there is a high risk of the transformation of modernization policies into a mechanism of the reproduction of imposed power.
Subjects:state bureaucracy
economic backwardness
catch-up modernization
conservative modernization
opportunism
institutional constraints
power
JEL:P51
P21
O17
P37
N40
B25
D73
K42
B15
A14
A13
B52
H83
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:HWWA Discussion Paper, Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv

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