Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19282
Authors: 
Michaelowa, Katharina
Borrmann, Axel
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
HWWA Discussion Paper 310
Abstract: 
Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies? conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.
Subjects: 
Development cooperation
evaluation
political economy
JEL: 
D73
F35
H43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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