Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19230
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKohler, Marionen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:56:39Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:56:39Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19230-
dc.description.abstractIn Kohler (2002) we analyse coalition formation in monetary policy coordination gamesbetween n countries. We find that positive spillovers of the coalition formation processand the resulting free-rider problem limit the stable coalition size: since the coalitionmembers are bound by the union?s discipline, an outsider can successfully export inflationwithout fearing that the insiders will try to do the same.In this paper, based on the same model, we allow countries to join competing coalitions.The formation of a large currency bloc is not sustainable since it would impose toomuch discipline on all participants. However, the co-existence of several smaller currencyblocs may be a second-best solution to the free-riding problem of monetary policycoordination.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aHamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) |cHamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aHWWA Discussion Paper |x258en_US
dc.subject.jelF42en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCurrency unionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinternational policy coordinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordFree-ridingen_US
dc.subject.keywordCoalition formationen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen_US
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwWährungsraumen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCompeting coalitions in international monetary policy gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn37731420Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26274-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
292.17 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.