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Title:On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups PDF Logo
Authors:Sadiraj, Vjollca
Tuinstra, Jan
van Winden, Frans
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1698
Abstract:Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Subjects:spatial voting models
electoral competition
winning set
interest groups
JEL:D72
D71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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