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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19139
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| Title: | | A model of income insurance and social norms  |
| Authors: | | Lindbeck, Assar Persson, Mats |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1675 |
| Abstract: | | A large literature on ex ante moral hazard in income insurance emphasizes that the individual can affect the probability of an income loss by choice of lifestyle and hence, the degree of risk-taking. The much smaller literature on moral hazard ex post mainly analyzes how a ?moral hazard constraint? can make the individual abstain from fraud (?mimicking?). The present paper instead presents a model of moral hazard ex post without a moral hazard constraint; the individual's ability and willingness to work is represented by a continuous stochastic variable in the utility function, and the extent of moral hazard depends on the generosity of the insurance system. Our model is also well suited for analyzing social norms concerning work and benefit dependency. |
| Subjects: | | moral hazard sick pay insurance labor supply asymmetric information |
| JEL: | | H53 I38 J21 G22 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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