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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19134
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Englmaier, Florian | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Reisinger, Markus | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:55:17Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:55:17Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2006 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19134 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1670 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O12 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C79 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | information | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | coordination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | industrialization | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | development | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | global games | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | equilibrium refinements | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | big push | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Industrialisierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Investition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Investitionspolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklungspolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gleichgewicht | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Information, coordination, and the industrialization of countries | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 510022723 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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