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dc.contributor.authorEnglmaier, Florianen_US
dc.contributor.authorReisinger, Markusen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:17Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:17Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19134-
dc.description.abstractThe industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1670en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelF21en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelO14en_US
dc.subject.jelO12en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinformationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordindustrializationen_US
dc.subject.keyworddevelopmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium refinementsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbig pushen_US
dc.subject.stwIndustrialisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.titleInformation, coordination, and the industrialization of countriesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510022723en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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