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Title:Long persuasion games PDF Logo
Authors:Forges, Françoise
Koessler, Frédéric
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1669
Abstract:This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.
Subjects:cheap talk
communication
diconvexification
dimartingale
disclosure of certifiable information
jointly controlled lotteries
JEL:D82
C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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