Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19132
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.contributor.authorHaller, Hansen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:17Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:17Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19132-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model whereindividuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options intwo different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join otherexisting groups. Hypothetical outside options refer to hypothetical groups that are ultimatelynot formed. Articulation of hypothetical outside options in the bargaining process determinesthe relative bargaining power of the members of a group, which constitutes an instance of thepower of voice. The adopted equilibrium concept endogenizes the outside options as well asthe power of voice. In our illustrative example, there exists an equilibrium that uniquelydetermines the power of voice and the allocation of commodities.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working papers |x1668en_US
dc.subject.jelD13en_US
dc.subject.jelD5en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPower of Voiceen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitive equilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordgroup formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordarticulation of outside optionsen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAbwanderung und Widerspruchen_US
dc.subject.stwMachten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleVoice and bargaining poweren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510020992en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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