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dc.contributor.authorGoerke, Laszloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:16Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19130-
dc.description.abstractFirms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a nonsystematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1666en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfirmsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax evasionen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuervermeidungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerkriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwKosten-Nutzen-Analyseen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn51002002Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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