Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19130 
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dc.contributor.authorGoerke, Laszloen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:16Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19130-
dc.description.abstractFirms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on productionactivities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affectcorruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induceless corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a nonsystematicimpact on tax evasion behaviour.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1666en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelH25en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordfirmsen
dc.subject.keywordtax evasionen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen
dc.subject.stwSteuervermeidungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerkriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwKosten-Nutzen-Analyseen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn51002002Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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