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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19130
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| Title: | | Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion  |
| Authors: | | Goerke, Laszlo |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1666 |
| Abstract: | | Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a nonsystematic impact on tax evasion behaviour. |
| Subjects: | | corruption firms tax evasion |
| JEL: | | D73 H26 H25 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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