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Title:Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion PDF Logo
Authors:Goerke, Laszlo
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1666
Abstract:Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a nonsystematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.
Subjects:corruption
firms
tax evasion
JEL:D73
H26
H25
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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