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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Büttner, Thiess | en |
dc.contributor.author | Hauptmeier, Sebastian | en |
dc.contributor.author | Schwager, Robert | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:55:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:55:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19120 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalizefiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditionsunder which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. Asystem of redistributive grants among governments is introduced into a standard model of taxcompetition. This basic model is then extended in order to allow for variations in thegovernment objectives at the state level. A subsequent empirical analysis of local tax policyexploits the experience with local fiscal revenue sharing in Germany. The results suggest thatattempts of state level governments to extract fiscal resources from the local revenue sharingsystem exert an upward pressure on tax rates. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1656 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H71 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H77 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fiscal equalization | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tax competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fiscal federalism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Germany | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kommunaler Finanzausgleich | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerwettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzföderalismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Deutschland | en |
dc.title | Efficient revenue sharing and upper level governments : theory and application to Germany | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 510016707 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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