EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19120
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBüttner, Thiessen_US
dc.contributor.authorHauptmeier, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:12Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19120-
dc.description.abstractRecent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A system of redistributive grants among governments is introduced into a standard model of tax competition. This basic model is then extended in order to allow for variations in the government objectives at the state level. A subsequent empirical analysis of local tax policy exploits the experience with local fiscal revenue sharing in Germany. The results suggest that attempts of state level governments to extract fiscal resources from the local revenue sharing system exert an upward pressure on tax rates.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1656en_US
dc.subject.jelH71en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal equalizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordGermanyen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunaler Finanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleEfficient revenue sharing and upper level governments : theory and application to Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510016707en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
cesifo1_wp1656.pdf528.1 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.