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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19103
  

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dc.contributor.authorPoutvaara, Panuen_US
dc.contributor.authorPriks, Mikaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:04Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:04Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19103-
dc.description.abstractDemocratic societies are challenged by various violent and organized groups, be they terrorists, gangs or organized hooligans. In exchange for offering an identity, leaders in such groups typically require members to be violent. We introduce a simple model to capture these stylized facts, and then study the effects of policing. We find that an increase in the marginal cost of violence always reduces violence, while increasing the indiscriminate fixed cost may backfire and result in smaller and more violent groups.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1639en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordviolenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordterrorismen_US
dc.subject.keywordgangsen_US
dc.subject.keywordhooliganismen_US
dc.subject.keywordsupporter clubsen_US
dc.subject.stwGewalten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwHooliganismen_US
dc.titleViolent groups and police tactics : should tear gas make crime preventers cry?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510009522en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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