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dc.contributor.authorCigno, Alessandroen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19096-
dc.description.abstractThe paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1632en_US
dc.subject.jelJ1en_US
dc.subject.jelI2en_US
dc.subject.jelH5en_US
dc.subject.jelH31en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.jelD91en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordintergenerational cooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfamilyen_US
dc.subject.keywordfertilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsavingen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivate transfersen_US
dc.subject.keywordeducationen_US
dc.subject.keywordchild benefitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpensionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordself-enforcing constitutionsen_US
dc.subject.stwGenerationenbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwVerfassungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwAlterssicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienleistungsausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe political economy of intergenerational cooperationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn509897843en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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