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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19096
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Cigno, Alessandro | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:55:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:55:01Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19096 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1632 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J1 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | I2 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H5 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H31 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D7 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H2 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | intergenerational cooperation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | family | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | fertility | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | saving | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | private transfers | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | education | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | child benefits | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | pensions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | self-enforcing constitutions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Generationenbeziehungen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kooperation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verfassungsökonomik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Alterssicherung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Familienleistungsausgleich | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The political economy of intergenerational cooperation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 509897843 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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