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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19096
  
Title:The political economy of intergenerational cooperation PDF Logo
Authors:Cigno, Alessandro
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1632
Abstract:The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.
Subjects:intergenerational cooperation
family
fertility
saving
private transfers
education
child benefits
pensions
self-enforcing constitutions
JEL:J1
I2
H5
H31
D7
D91
D82
H2
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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