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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19093
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| Title: | | Wage bargaining and political strength in the public sector  |
| Authors: | | Falch, Torberg Str?m, Bjarne |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1629 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain. |
| Subjects: | | public sector labor market wage bargaining political strength budgetary process |
| JEL: | | H72 D73 J45 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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