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Title:Wage bargaining and political strength in the public sector PDF Logo
Authors:Falch, Torberg
Str?m, Bjarne
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1629
Abstract:This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain.
Subjects:public sector labor market
wage bargaining
political strength
budgetary process
JEL:H72
D73
J45
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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