Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19089
Authors: 
Bucovetsky, Sam
Haufler, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working papers 1625
Abstract: 
We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms' decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively. Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is beneficial or harmful for the competing countries depends critically on the elasticity with which the firms' organizational structure responds to tax discrimination incentives. The model can be applied to policy initiatives that aim at a ban on preferential tax regimes and at reducing the profit shifting opportunities for multinational firms.
Subjects: 
tax competition
multinational firms
preferential treatment
JEL: 
F23
H73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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