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dc.contributor.authorSørensen, Erik Ø.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHole, Astri D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCappelen, Alexander W.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTungodden, Bertilen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:53Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19075-
dc.description.abstractA core question in the contemporary debate on distributive justice is how the fair distribution of income is affected by differences in talent and effort. Important theories of distributive justice, such as strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism and libertarianism, all give different answers to this question. This paper presents the results from a version of the dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase. Each player?s contribution is a result of an exogenously given talent and a chosen effort. We estimate simultaneously the prevalence of three main principles of distributive justice among the players as well as the distribution of weights they attach to fairness considerations.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1611en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwVermögensverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleThe pluralism of fairness ideals : an experimental approachen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn509697399en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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