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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:52Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19073-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ?early? and a group of players who choose ?late?. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ?late?, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1609en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsequential all-pay auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomplete informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneralized costen_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneralized Stackelberg gameen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThegeneralized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn509694217en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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