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dc.contributor.authorParigi, Bruno Mariaen_US
dc.contributor.authorPelizzon, Lorianaen_US
dc.coverage.temporal1998-2000en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:44Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19054-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a mean-variance general equilibrium economy where the expected returns for controlling and non-controlling shareholders are different because the former are able to divert a fraction of the profits. We find that when investor protection is poor, asset return correlation affects ownership structure in a positive way. Higher return correlation lowers the benefits of diversification which causes a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in his asset and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model. In particular, controlling for measures of the quality of the investor protection, the legal origin of the countries, and other structural variables as in a previous study by La Porta et al. (1998) we find that equity ownership is significantly more concentrated in countries where stock return correlation is higher, and that the magnitude of this effect is larger in countries where investor protection is poorer.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1590en_US
dc.subject.jelG2en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelG3en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestor protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivate benefitsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiversification opportunitiesen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwAnlegerschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragen_US
dc.subject.stwKorrelationen_US
dc.subject.stwPortfolio-Managementen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleDiversification and ownership concentrationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503743887en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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