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Title:Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes PDF Logo
Authors:Nielsen, Søren Bo
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1586
Abstract:The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise?s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.
Subjects:centralized vs. de-centralized decisions
taxes
MNEs
JEL:F23
H25
L23
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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