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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19050
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| Title: | | Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes  |
| Authors: | | Nielsen, Søren Bo Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis Schjelderup, Guttorm |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1586 |
| Abstract: | | The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise?s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large. |
| Subjects: | | centralized vs. de-centralized decisions taxes MNEs |
| JEL: | | F23 H25 L23 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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